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ABSTRACT 
Using the Papathoma Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment Model 
To Forecast Probable Impacts, and Planning Implications, of a 
500-year Tsunami in Cayucos, California 
Andrew Robert Marshall 
 
This report focuses on using the Papathoma Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment 
Model (PTVA) to demonstrate the vulnerability of Cayucos to a 500-year tsunami, and 
uses the results to inform specific planning recommendations.  By modeling inundation 
with GIS and analyzing building attributes via the PTVA model, this study has gone 
beyond any previous vulnerability assessments of Cayucos.  Findings include: 
delineation of the most vulnerable areas, estimates of numbers of lost civic buildings, 
commercial buildings and houses, as well as estimates of people displaced from tsunami 
damaged homes.  The report goes on to discuss what mitigation measures are in place 
and what further specific steps could be taken to ensure the long term sustainability of 
the town and help reduce future tsunami losses. 
In the absence of fully developed, and accessible assessment tools; local 
planners have had only basic information to assess the community’s tsunami 
vulnerability. The Papathoma Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment Model (PTVA) is a 
validated method that uses available tsunami runup estimations and field data collection 
to produce a detailed assessment of individual building survivability and overall 
community vulnerability.   
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1. Introduction 
Tsunamis are among the most devastating natural hazards and can affect almost 
any coast in the world.  The Pacific Rim, known as the “Ring of Fire” to geologists, is a 
very seismically active region where tectonic plates that form the seafloor collide with the 
continents. The subduction zones that form at the tectonic plates’ boundaries are 
capable of producing earthquakes that generate tsunamis that can radiate across the 
whole Pacific.   
Tsunami waves have an extremely long wavelength and little height as they 
travel through the open ocean.  They can cross an ocean at up to 600 miles per hour 
while causing little surface disturbance (CA OES, 2013).  Upon entering shallow water a 
tsunami, like any wave, “feels bottom”, its wavelength decreases and height increases.  
The resulting wave rushes onshore, often more like a rapidly rising tide than a curling, 
breaking wave.  Most tsunami events consist of multiple waves. While the waves 
themselves are destructive, wave driven debris can cause much of the damage to the 
built environment.  The severity of a tsunami is not measured by the height of the wave, 
but rather by the level of runup.  Runup is the highest elevation on shore that the 
tsunami waves attain. The term inundation area is used to describe the inland area that 
is flooded.  The inundation area is determined by local topography and runup height.  
Depending on these factors tsunami inundation may extend many kilometers inland, or 
only impact a narrow coastal margin.  
The west coast of the United States is vulnerable to Pacific wide tsunamis 
caused by distant earthquakes, as well as locally generated tsunamis.  There have been 
a total of 419 recorded tsunami events in the history of the U.S.A. (National Geophysical 
Data Center n.d.).  The majority of these (308) have originated in the Pacific Ocean 
(National Geophysical Data Center n.d.).   
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The areas of the world that are most likely to produce Pacific wide tsunamis (tele-
tsunamis) are well known.  Those most threatening to California include the Cascadia 
Subduction Zone off the Oregon coast, and the Aleutian Islands Subduction Zone (Miller, 
2014).  Tele-tsunamis can be very destructive but with modern technology their 
generation and arrival can be accurately predicted, and often there is time to evacuate 
and prepare.  For example, a tsunami produced by the Cascadia Subduction Zone 
would arrive in California one to two hours after generation, while a tsunami from the 
Aleutian Islands would arrive in four to six hours (Miller, 2014). 
The California coast could also be affected by tsunamis generated by local 
earthquakes or underwater landslides.  These types of tsunamis can be just as 
destructive as or even more so than tele-tsunamis.  The largest tsunami recorded in 
California was locally generated by an earthquake in the Santa Barbara Channel in 
1812.  It caused runup of 35 feet in Santa Barbara and 50 feet in Gaviota (SLO County, 
2011).  As locally generated tsunamis strike very shortly after their generating event, 
there is often little or no advance warning of their approach.  A local tsunami could be 
onshore in as little as ten minutes after its generating event (Miller, 2014). 
California has experienced many recorded tsunamis.  However compared to 
other locations on the Pacific Rim, historical events in California have been mild.  The 
one notable exception would be events in the northern Californian town of Crescent City, 
which has had about 30 tsunamis in the last 80 years and has suffered the loss of 
dozens of lives (Padilla, 2012). 
San Luis Obispo County, on the central coast of California, has also experienced 
tsunamis, but nothing that could be considered a major event.  The County is vulnerable 
to tele-tsunamis (those generated over 1000 miles away) as well as tsunamis that could 
be generated by local faults (SLO County, 2013).  It has been affected by all of the 
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notable Pacific wide tele-tsunamis of the last century, including the 2011 Tohoku 
tsunami, which caused $500,000 in damage to docks and piers in Morro Bay (SLO 
County, 2013).  Typically, tsunami runups experienced in San Luis Obispo have not 
exceeded more than a few meters above sea level, and caused only limited damage and 
no recorded loss of life (SLO County, 2013). 
Coastal areas in San Luis Obispo County are also vulnerable to sea level rise 
that can magnify tsunami impacts.  The State Hazard Mitigation Plan estimates that on 
the central coast, sea level has the potential to rise between 1.38 and 5.48 feet by the 
year 2100 (CA OES, 2013).  This could increase the damage created by a tsunami not 
just by increasing runup height, but also by causing the erosion of natural protective 
structures like beaches and bluffs.   
Because of the relatively benign history of tsunamis in most of California, the risk 
to the state has been given little regard for years outside of scientific circles. Then the 
Pacific wide damage from the 2011 tsunami called everyone’s’ attention to tsunami risk 
in California.  Since then there have been serious efforts in the state to increase tsunami 
mapping and mitigation efforts as well as to study possible impacts.  California is now on 
the cusp of adding tsunami mitigation to various state laws.  
Technical studies of tsunami modeling and hazard analysis are currently being 
carried out to determine probabilistic tsunami return intervals that will be developed into 
tsunami hazard maps; much like how seismic terrestrial hazards are assessed in 
California. Probabilistic models of tsunamis in California are currently unavailable but are 
being developed by the California Geologic Survey through the California Seismic 
Hazard Mapping Act (CGS, 2015).  They are considered to provide a better 
understanding of the hazard than a single “worst case” type of model. The probabilistic 
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maps will make understanding a location’s risk easier for local decision makers, and 
tsunami planning. 
Additionally future tsunami runup predictions will be more accurate; researchers 
are developing models that take into account complex local bathymetry and can predict 
tsunami magnitudes potentially generated by specific faults (CA OES, 2013).   Others 
are working to understand how the dynamic forces of tsunami waves interact with the 
urban environment (California Tsunami Policy Working Group, 2014).  In the future, 
based on this expanding body of knowledge, there may be federal and state action taken 
to implement advanced tsunami mitigation.  Some of this mitigation could be in the form 
of subsidized insurance and enhanced building codes.  These are both currently being 
developed: FEMA will soon add tsunami inundation return intervals to their Flood 
Insurance Rate Maps (CGS, 2015).  Also, a national engineering committee is working to 
establish building design standards that resist tsunamis for incorporation into the 
International Building Code by 2018 (CGS, 2015).  
Additionally FEMA is currently working towards developing a tsunami modeling 
addition to their HAZUS program (CGS, 2015).  The HAZUS program is a publically 
available, GIS based, multi-hazard risk modeling program.  The program is able to 
assess the physical, economic and social impacts of hurricanes, floods and 
earthquakes.  It can be used to identify vulnerabilities for mitigation before an emergency 
event occurs or for rapid needs assessments after.  Having this program developed for 
tsunamis will add a significant capability to local planners’ ability to assess their tsunami 
vulnerability. 
In addition to scientific research there is a movement to formulate and implement 
mitigation strategies.  An interdisciplinary group of researchers, scholars and policy 
experts formed the California Tsunami Policy Working Group to study how California can 
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prepare for the next tsunami. Their efforts yielded 47 recommendations that shared 
three goals: build a solid foundation for mitigation, practice risk-based land-use and 
construction, and enhance emergency management (The California Tsunami Policy 
Working Group, 2014).  If the recommendations can be implemented; California will 
have tsunami mitigation integrated into many aspects of government including: land use 
planning, building codes, interagency relationships and university education.  Their study 
presents the state-of-the-art of California tsunami mitigation planning.  
There are many resources available for local jurisdictions to use for 
understanding their tsunami risk and implementing mitigation measures. These tools are 
well suited for working at a county or regional level, but a gap exists in planning at the 
community or neighborhood level.  The FEMA HAZUS program will help to fill this gap 
but until the tsunami modeling addition is fully developed, there are other methods that 
planners can use to assess their community’s risk and identify their most vulnerable 
areas.   
The field of quantitatively assessing tsunami vulnerability and loss is young.  It is 
only in the last decade or so that serious research in this field has been accomplished, 
and there are still unknown factors about how the built environment reacts to tsunami 
loading and the dynamic forces of waves traveling through the built environment (CA 
OES, 2013).  Though the field is young, there is a usable, validated method to assess 
tsunami vulnerability: the Papathoma Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment Model.  Using 
this relatively user friendly building vulnerability assessment methodology it is possible to 
model what affect a tsunami event might have upon the built environment.   
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The San Luis Obispo County Local Hazard Mitigation Plan 
San Luis Obispo County has taken active and appropriate steps toward 
mitigating, or reducing or eliminating long term risk of, tsunamis. There are two County 
documents governing tsunami mitigation: The San Luis Obispo County Local Hazard 
Mitigation Plan (LHMP) (2013) and the Tsunami Emergency Response Plan (2011). The 
San Luis Obispo County Fire Department and CAL FIRE have greatly contributed to the 
effort by producing detailed inundation area maps that include evacuation routes and 
other important features.  
The San Luis Obispo County Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (2013) includes one 
section on tsunami risk, and has one map illustrating the Cal OES defined tsunami 
inundation zone.  The map delineates these areas very broadly, simply showing the 
entire coastal margin of the county as being included in the zone. It states that much of 
the County is not very vulnerable to tsunamis as many areas protected by wide beaches, 
dunes, or sea cliffs.  Some specific areas that are more vulnerable are called out.  They 
include (among others): Cayucos Creek, Little Cayucos Creek, Old Creek and Willow 
Creek in Cayucos.  
The plan judges the probability of tsunamis affecting the County to be “somewhat 
likely (between 1 and 10% chance in a given year)”, and states that “limited damage” 
could occur in impacted areas.  Secondary impacts like economic losses and health 
impacts due to loss of function of facilities and evacuations are rated as “negligible”.  
However, the plan states that tsunamis could result in damage to roads and bridges and 
could devastate piers, docks, moored boats and agriculture (SLO County, 2013). 
The LHMP offers estimates of the potential damages to infrastructure by various 
disasters including tsunamis (Table 1.).  These are worst case scenarios of damage to 
critical structures and infrastructure.  Assuming a 100% loss of all infrastructure in the 
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inundation zone, the estimated potential damage to the county is estimated at $ 
2,171,998,000..  This is the second highest damage estimate of any hazard in the 
LHMP. 
Predictions of tsunami runups are given; citing a 1978 study that indicates the 
Cayucos/Morro Bay coast could expect 100 and 500 year return interval tsunami runups 
to be 9.5 feet and 24.2 feet respectively (SLO County, 2013).  This is based on a tele-
tsunami generated in the Aleutian Islands or the Chile-Peru trench, arriving at high tide.  
If a tsunami were to occur during a storm, at high tide, an additional 14.5 feet could be 
added to its height, producing 24 (100 yr) and 39 foot (500 yr) runups. These predictions 
are consistent with historical tsunamis measured in other parts of California (SLO 
County, 2013).  
 
 Table 1. LHMP Hazard Damage Estimates   
 
 
Hazard 
 
Total Building Replacement Value 
Estimated 
Percent 
Damage 
 
Estimated 
Potential Damage 
Value Earthquake 2,990,415,000 100% 2,990,415,000 
Flooding 764,145,000 50% 382,072,500 
Wildfire 2,170,833,000 25% 542,708,250 
Tsunami 2,171,998,000 100%                   2,171,998,000 
Adverse Weather 2,685,515,000 10% 268,551,500 
 Slo County LHMP 2013        
 
 Other hazards relating to tsunami impacts discussed in the LHMP include 
earthquakes and coastal erosion.  Earthquake potential in the County is high.  There are 
many active and inactive faults in the County, and four surrounding Cayucos:  the 
Cayucos, Oceanic, Cambria and Hosgri fault zones.  The Cayucos fault zone is directly 
beneath the town but considered inactive, with a low potential of fault rupture hazard.  
The Oceanic fault is considered a moderate fault rupture hazard, but is several 
8 
  
kilometers north of town.  The Cambria fault is also a moderate fault rupture hazard and 
is mapped as going offshore north of Cayucos and returning to shore as a broad zone of 
faults that pass through the town (SLO County, 2013).  The LHMP states that the further 
study of the Cayucos fault is needed prior to allowing structures to be built near the 
mapped fault traces.   The Hosgri fault system is located offshore, running parallel to the 
coast, and is capable of producing up to a 7.3 magnitude earthquake (SLO County, 
2013).  It has been included in a HAZUS seismic risk assessment scenario in the LHMP, 
but its tsunamigenic capacity was not evaluated or considered. 
 Coastal erosion is also a hazard in Cayucos.  It is a complex issue that involves 
local geology, exposure to wave energy, sea level rise and the built environment.  Based 
on these factors, coastal areas in SLO County are exposed to varying levels of erosion.  
As coastal erosion takes place it can cause the retreat of bluffs and undermine 
oceanfront structures.   FEMA predicts that erosion may destroy one of every four 
houses within 500 feet of the shoreline in the next 60 years (SLO County, 2013).  In 
addition to direct loss, coastal erosion can expose more structures to hazards 
associated with the water front, like tsunami inundation.   
 In Cayucos many oceanfront homes are built on bluffs that are composed of 
easily erodible Franciscan Mélange rock formations (SLO County, 2013).  There is a 
high erosion potential:  an average year can see 6 to 10 inches of erosion, and during a 
1983 storm some bluffs eroded as much as 20 feet inland (SLO, County, 2013).   
Additionally, downtown Cayucos is built on unconsolidated riverine sediment, and is also 
very susceptible to shoreline erosion.   
The County has adopted tsunami mitigation measures via the LHMP that seek to 
minimize the level of damage that could be inflicted. These apply to Cayucos and 
include: 
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1. Provide the coastal cities assistance in updating their tsunami plans, maps, and 
evacuation processes.   
2. Provide training to appropriate agencies on changes to tsunami emergency plans 
and pre-response plans and policies.   
3. Maintain emergency responder pre-response plans for ongoing tsunami 
inundation areas.    
4. Install tsunami area warning signs (deferred). 
TsunamiReady® 
Additionally the County is in the process of becoming TsunamiReady®.   
TsunamiReady® is a voluntary tsunami mitigation program administered by The National 
Weather Service that focuses on raising a community’s level of preparedness through 
educating emergency managers and the public about tsunami risk and improving 
communications and emergency response plans.  Becoming TsunamiReady® ensures 
preparedness, confers recognition upon a community, and can put a community in an 
improved position to receive federal and state grant funds.  To become TsunamiReady® 
a community must meet standard guidelines that are scaled to reflect the size of the 
community.  Since Cayucos is an unincorporated town, under the jurisdiction of San Luis 
Obispo County, it is up to the county to implement the program, at a county wide level.  
San Luis Obispo County is currently working with NOAA to become TsunamiReady® (E. 
Boldt, NOAA, personal communication, May 18, 2015).   This certification will also cover 
other unincorporated coastal towns in the county like Avila Beach and Cambria. 
Appendix B details the guidelines that must be attained, many of which are already met.  
Cayucos is currently tied into the county’s warning siren system and covered by county 
emergency response plans.  The TsunamiReady® program will provide educational 
programs as well as tsunami warning signs in Cayucos. 
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Meeting the guidelines and becoming TsunamiReady® is a strong effort on the 
part of the county to prepare for tsunamis and prevent the loss of life. It is a relatively 
easy mitigation tool to implement as it does not require spending large amounts of funds 
for building projects like some other mitigation methods do.  Nor does it require the use 
of potentially unpopular policies to accomplish, like some tsunami planning land use 
decisions might. 
Tsunami Emergency Response Plan 
The SLO County Tsunami Emergency Response Plan is an appendix to the SLO 
County Office of Emergency Services Emergency Response Operations Plan.  The 
document repeats much of what is written in the LHMP but offers more detail about 
possible effects of tsunamis, these include: 
 Mass injuries 
 Emergency medical services disruptions, including hospitals 
 School disruptions 
 Hazardous materials releases 
 Fires 
 Need for short term evacuations 
 Utility disruptions: gas, electric, water, sanitation 
 Transportation system disruptions 
 Traffic management problems 
 Communication disruptions 
 Disease and health hazards 
 Loss of commerce and government resources 
 
The Tsunami Emergency Response Plan cites a study done by the University Of 
Southern California (for Cal EMA) estimating a general maximum tsunami runup on the 
coast of SLO County being 40 feet (12.1m) above mean sea level.  With this number in 
mind the county established an evacuation zone of all coastal areas below 50 feet in 
elevation, providing a ten foot elevation buffer between the estimated maximum 
inundation level and the limit of the evacuated area.  Sea level rise will amplify the 
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impacts of tsunami runup in the future and cause this estimate to be an underestimation 
in terms of runup above sea level and also the area inundated 
 
SLO Fire Department Inundation Maps 
 
The SLO County Fire Department and CAL FIRE developed a series of detailed 
tsunami inundation maps for use by emergency responders (Appendix 1.).  The 
Northern Cayucos Tsunami Planning map (2011) offers this about the community’s 
situation: 
This small town has ingress and egress points at Highway 1 (north and south) 
and Old Creek Rd to the east. The northern end of the town is expected to incur 
major damage in the event of a large tsunami. The downtown area, including fuel 
stations, schools and the local fire station are all well within the inundation zone, 
as are many homes along the low-lying beach front properties.  
 
These maps have been made available to emergency responders and can be viewed on 
the SLO Fire Department’s website, but are otherwise not generally circulated. 
Cayucos and the Need for This Study 
Cayucos is a small beach community on Estero Bay in San Luis Obispo County 
(Appendix C.).  The economy is tourism based and the community is a peaceful, family 
friendly getaway, popular with people from cities or inland areas.  The laidback 
downtown area fronts the ocean and has restaurants, cafes, wine tasting, hotels and 
surfboard rentals.  A historical pier is located in the downtown and serves as an 
attraction and landmark.  The population of the community is listed as 2,475 in the 2013 
U.S. Census; however this number fluctuates by an unknown number seasonally as 
visitors and part-time residents come and go.  The downtown is low lying and much of 
the community’s business district as well as the fire station, gas station, pier, and hotels 
are located in the 500-year inundation zone.  Also, hundreds of homes along the shore 
are at risk. 
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It is recognized in the LHMP and the SLO County FD inundation maps that 
Cayucos is at elevated risk to tsunamis. The map produced by Cal Fire and the SLO 
County Fire Department is very detailed and valuable for understanding generally where 
the hazard zone is in Cayucos. However, to better understand which specific areas in 
the community are the most vulnerable, a more in depth type of study is needed, and the 
small size of the community makes this level of analysis practical. 
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2. Methodology  
The method used in this study to assess the community’s tsunami vulnerability is 
the Papathoma Tsunami Vulnerability Assessment Model (PTVA).  This method for 
calculating tsunami vulnerability and maximum loss was developed in the early 2000s by 
Maria Papthoma-Kohle and Dale Dominey-Howes (researchers from the Universities of 
New South Wales and Vienna respectively) (Dominey-Howes et al., 2007).  It has been 
validated, or ground truthed, by field research in the wake of the 2004 Boxing Day 
tsunami.  After the tsunami, researchers visited South Male’ Atoll in the Maldives and 
found that tsunami damage closely correlated with PTVA estimations (Dominey-Howes 
et al., 2007).  The model has since been peer reviewed and applied in the Greek Islands 
and Seaside, Oregon.  
The PTVA model takes into account physical factors that influence a building’s 
survivability during a tsunami, and rates the building’s overall vulnerability.  Factors that 
influence vulnerability include: inundation depth, building row number (from the water), 
construction material, number of floors, building orientation, condition of building, 
building surroundings and land cover. These attributes have been identified, through 
analysis of tsunami damage assessment surveys and engineering reports as being the 
most important factors affecting building survivability (Dominey-Howes et al., 2010).   
Table 2 summarizes the attributes in weighted order as used in the study.  The 
scale follows a logical progression with a buildings level of exposure to inundation 
ranking as more important than anything about the building itself.  The two most highly 
weighted attributes relate to the level of exposure and include Inundation depth and the 
building’s row from the sea.  These attributes categorize how high the inundation is and 
how many buildings are in the way to bear the brunt of the wave force.  These are the 
main determinants of building survivability. The other attributes related to building 
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material, design and surroundings are considerably less important, but in aggregate can 
serve to influence survivability. 
 The model assigns a score to each attribute.  Buildings are inspected and raw 
scores taken for each attribute. Raw scores for the eight data fields are converted into 
ratios for comparison by dividing the individual score by the highest possible score for 
that data field. This results in a standardization of scores to between 0 and 1 for each 
data attribute.  Next these ratio scores are weighted according to the weighting scale 
developed by Papathoma and her associates’ expert judgement.  To do this the ratio 
scores for each attribute are multiplied by the weight associated with that attribute, they 
are then summed.  Where “a,b,c,d,e,f,g, and h” are the ratio scores of each attribute: 
Vulnerability=(8xa)+(7xb)+(6xc)+(5xd)+(4xe)+(3xf)+(2xg)+(1xh) 
The overall scores are then separated into five equal intervals to create a 
vulnerability scale that ranges from low, medium low, medium, medium high to high.   
These ratings represent predictions of relative vulnerability to damage, and not specific 
damages.  In the PTVA model, buildings that score “high” and “medium high” are 
considered to be complete losses.  Inundation depth is the most important factor in 
deciding vulnerability, and those buildings that score “high” and “medium high” are 
largely associated with higher inundation levels (>4 meters). Those buildings that receive 
lower vulnerability scores would certainly sustain damage during a tsunami, but would 
likely be repairable (Dominey-Howes et al., 2010).  
While the original PTVA has been validated in the field after the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami, meaning that its results have roughly correlated with actual damages, it 
is a first generation assessment tool. There have subsequently been criticisms of, and 
suggested improvements to, the model.  A common criticism of the original PTVA model 
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is the manner in which attributes are weighted.  The original model relies on the “expert” 
judgement of its creators to weigh attributes.  Other researchers have developed a 
revised model of the PTVA and used “M-Macbeth” software in an attempt create a more 
accurately weighted scale.  This program allows a panel of experts to input their 
individual weighting judgements, and then verifies their consistency and generates a 
rated scale.  This process produces a more accurate product with less subjectivity than 
the original model.  Also, researchers have suggested adding other building attributes to 
the model such as: the presence of outdoor movable furniture, type of ground level 
windows, foundation type, and insurance policy adequacy (Dall'Osso et al., 2009).  It 
would have been possible to add some of the additional attributes to the model for this 
study, but others, like the foundation type (the presence or absence of a basement), or 
insurance policy adequacy would be impossible to assess without entering buildings or 
interviewing building owners.  This would have been impossible to accomplish given the 
number of buildings involved and the limited time allocated for the study.  There have 
been no published statistical comparisons of results between the original model and the 
amended models to suggest that they offer significant benefits.  
Additionally, some researchers criticize the PTVA model because it does not 
account for the force of the tsunami itself and how it changes when encountering an 
urban environment.  These forces are undeniably very important to the vulnerability 
equation.  To attempt to address this, researchers are currently developing fragility curve 
models to account for the dynamic forces of water against buildings. These models 
relate water depth to the probability of structure failure and will allow for more accurate 
building damage assessments (Wiebe, 2014).  Given the current absence of usable 
fragility curve models and limitations of time that this Cayucos study faced, and that the 
updates to the model have not been proven to be any more accurate than the original, it 
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was decided that the original PTVA would give sufficiently accurate results for the 
planning purposes that the project was intended for.   
The study was completed in 3 general steps.   
1. GIS analysis to determine the flood area and the average water depths for each 
building.   
2. Data collection and application of the PTVA model.   
3. Analysis of the data.                    
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 Table 2. PTVA Attributes in Descending Order of Weighted Importance 
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GIS Analysis 
To complete the study it was necessary to delineate the extent of the theoretical 
tsunami runup in Cayucos, and then to calculate an average water depth for each 
building.  Water depth is the most important factor in determining building survivability 
using the Papathoma Method.  All of the files needed for the project were available on 
the Cal Poly Kennedy Library’s GIS server. 
First San Luis Obispo County data was obtained from the Cal Poly Library GIS 
server.  Files obtained included: DEM and hillshade raster files, parcel, mean shoreline, 
roads and a building footprint (incomplete) vector shapefiles. The buildings layer from 
the county was missing over a hundred residential structures.  These were added to the 
layer by overlaying the building layer onto a satellite image to view the buildings as they 
are, and drawing in the missing buildings.  
The DEM and hillshade files covered the entirety of SLO County and were very 
large and slowed down computing speed.  They were clipped to just the Cayucos area to 
increase processing speed.  This was done by making a 1,200 foot right side buffer from 
the mean shoreline shapefile.  Then the “extract by mask” tool was used to clip the 
raster files to that buffer. The result was a smaller file that was easier to work with.   
Next the “raster calculator” tool from the “Map Algebra” toolbox was used to add 
the tsunami runup projection taken from the SLO County Tsunami Emergency Response 
Plan (12.1m) to the DEM.  This runup estimation was used because it is the most recent 
projection used by SLO County, and represents a worst case scenario.  This study was 
done with SLO County in mind as a client, so using their accepted runup estimate 
maintains consistency between county planning documents.  
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Then the “minus” tool was used to subtract the 12.1 m from all of the areas on 
the DEM greater than 12.1m in elevation.  This resulted in a “bathtub” type of flood 
model, where all areas under 12.1 meters on the DEM are filled in.  Now the model 
showing runup was complete, and it remained to find out the water depth per parcel.  
The “zonal statistic” tool was used to do this.  This tool averaged the water depth 
in each parcel, which could then be associated with the buildings on those parcels.  To 
make this data usable it had to be converted to a vector format.  This was done by using 
the “feature to point” tool to convert the buildings layer to centroid points instead of 
polygons.  Then the “extract values to points” tool was used to add the DEM’s averaged 
runup depth to the building centroid. The resulting map shows the average expected 
water depth for each building (Figure 1.). 
 
Figure 1. Averaged Inundation Depths in Downtown 
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Accuracy of the runup modeling was ensured by creating a topographic layer 
from the original DEM using 2 meter isolines.  Using this it was possible to visually verify 
that the runup raster layer went as far inland as the 12 meter isoline.  This same visual 
inspection was done using a SLO County supplied topographic layer.  In both cases the 
runup model was either near or in line with the two different topographic layers’ 12 meter 
(40 foot) lines. A series of eight GPS points were also taken using a TopCon GPS unit at 
prominent street corners in Cayucos to ensure the layer’s spatial accuracy on the 
ground. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
There are 745 buildings located in the study area’s 500 year inundation zone. Of 
these, 700 are private residential buildings; the remaining 45 are various commercial 
and government buildings in and around the downtown.  Some are historical buildings, 
but the majority are of relatively modern construction.  A preliminary inspection of the 
residential areas revealed that these buildings are largely similar in construction 
material, size, and shape. To speed the collection of data, Google’s Street View program 
was used to assess these buildings.  Google’s Street View offered current images of the 
area that could be used in conjunction with GIS, and allowed for effective surveying in 
these more homogeneous areas. Surveying the downtown area of Cayucos was done 
on foot.  Also, on the ground data collection was used to resolve data issues as they 
arose.  Field data was collected using hard copy data sheets (Appendix D.) and later 
entered into an Excel spreadsheet.  Data collected via Google Street View was directly 
entered into the spreadsheet. Data collected was based on the PTVA model and 
included: 
Water depth (a), weight=8- based on GIS projections, the average water depth for each 
building was automatically assigned. While the tsunami modeled for this study was one 
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with 12.1 meter runup.  The water depth that actually reached buildings was found to 
range from 0 to 8.4 meters in buildings in Cayucos. 
Building row from the ocean (b), weight=7- data collected for this field was based on 
a building’s location relative to the ocean.  Data was coded with a score of 12 equaling 
the first, ocean front row.  Subsequent inland rows were assigned scores in descending 
order to zero.  In places the layout of the community is somewhat unorganized and rows 
of buildings are staggered or not well defined.  In these cases a building’s score was 
based on how many buildings are between it and the ocean.   
Building Material (c), weight=6- Reinforced concrete construction is the least 
vulnerable, followed by masonry or concrete block; wooden buildings rate as the most 
vulnerable. The majority of the buildings in Cayucos are clearly of wood construction. 
Others have a stucco veneer. Common in California, these homes often have a wood 
frame with a thin veneer of concrete lining the outer walls.  A problem with this is that, 
viewed from the street, it may not be possible to tell if a stucco home is of wood frame, 
cast concrete, or concrete block construction. 
For this study it was assumed that these homes have a wood frame and were 
classified in this most vulnerable class.  The PTVA method does not account for this 
type of construction and how these types of buildings perform during a tsunami is 
unknown.  It is possible that the stucco veneer could aid in preserving structural integrity 
by resisting wave forces during a tsunami, but further research is needed to determine 
where these types of buildings fall on the vulnerability scale. 
Number of floors (d), weight=5- The number of floors not including attics. Second 
stories can aid in “vertical evacuation” of residents during floods and tsunamis.   
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Building orientation (e), weight=4- The orientation of a building relative to the ocean. A 
cubic building with walls parallel to the shore is the most vulnerable.  Those with a 
corner to the ocean or irregular in shape are somewhat less vulnerable as they receive 
less force from oncoming waves.  
Condition of building (f), weight=3- New buildings and buildings in good condition are 
less vulnerable to damage during a tsunami than unmaintained or dilapidated ones. 
Most of the buildings in Cayucos are new or otherwise in a good, maintained condition. 
Building surroundings (g), weight=2- The presence of durable protective structures 
can influence tsunami vulnerability.  Sturdy, high walls can act to keep water and debris 
out of buildings. In Cayucos there are few protective barriers in place.  Many homes 
have decorative walls for landscaping purposes, or picket fences. There are relatively 
few actual walls around buildings. 
Land cover (h), weight=1- The rates the ability of the surrounding land cover to lessen 
tsunami damage.  Owing to the aridity of the region, there is a paucity of vegetative 
cover and few large trees in Cayucos. Most properties were rated in the most vulnerable 
class for this attribute. 
After the GIS modeling and data collection were complete, the PTVA method 
was closely followed to calculate building vulnerability scores.  Raw scores for the eight 
data fields were standardized into ratios by dividing the individual score by the highest 
possible score for that data field. This resulted in a standardization of scores to between 
0 and 1 for each data attribute.  
Next the ratio scores were weighted according to the weighting scale developed 
by Papathoma.  To do this the ratio scores for each attribute were multiplied by the 
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weight associated with that field. The weighted scores were then summed to yield an 
overall “vulnerability” score.  
Vulnerability=(8xa)+(7xb)+(6xc)+(5xd)+(4xe)+(3xf)+(2xg)+(1xh) 
 “a,b,c,d,e,f,g, and h” are the ratio scores of each attribute. This calculation yielded 
vulnerability scores between 12.3 and 36. These weighted scores were then grouped 
into five equal interval ranges and assigned a corresponding vulnerability rating (Table 
3.).  According to the PTVA model, buildings that scored “high” and “medium high” were 
considered to be complete losses.  Inundation depth is the most important factor in 
deciding vulnerability, and those building that scored “high” and “medium high” are 
largely associated with higher inundation levels (generally >4 meters). Those buildings 
that received lower vulnerability scores would certainly sustain damage during a 
tsunami, but would likely be repairable (Dominey-Howes et al., 2010).  The scale is an 
estimation of relative vulnerability to damages, rather than an estimation of specific 
damages. The PTVA model does not account for partial damage or damage to the 
contents of buildings. 
                     Table 3. Vulnerability Rating Scale 
 
 
 
 
Equal Interval Score Ranges Vulnerability Rating
31.3-36. high
26.55-31.29 med-high
21.8-26.54 medium
17.05-21.79 med-low
12.3-17.04 low
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3. Results 
After mapping and applying the PTVA model we see that 32% of the 
community’s buildings are within the 500-year inundation zone (Figure 2.). These 
buildings had a range of vulnerability scores from medium low to high that generally 
correlated with higher (>4 meter) inundation; resulting in a total of 18.5 % of all buildings 
in Cayucos likely to suffer complete destruction (assuming that all buildings ranked in the 
high and medium high vulnerability classes will be completely destroyed (Dominey-
Howes, et al, 2010)).  Many of the most affected buildings are also very important ones; 
downtown businesses as well as civic and government buildings. 
The highest vulnerability ratings and inundation levels are found in the low lying 
downtown area and the residential area along Old Creek.  Also, most ocean front homes 
fall into the medium high classification and are considered total losses by the PTVA 
assessment model.  Within the inundation area we can expect a loss of 56.8% of all 
buildings (high and medium-high ratings).  Although the medium and medium low rated 
buildings would escape complete destruction according to the model; they would 
undoubtedly suffer damages, and the PTVA model does not account for partial damage 
or damage to the contents of buildings.  Also, some notable structures in Cayucos could 
not be assessed with the PTVA model: a trailer park, water treatment facility, and the 
pier.  
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Figure 2. PTVA Assessment Results 
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Commercial Buildings and Downtown 
Most of the commercial buildings in Cayucos are in the 500 year inundation 
zone, and are very vulnerable to tsunami damage.  The downtown water front area is 
low lying and the GIS model predicts inundation of up to 8 meters here. Eighty percent of 
buildings here scored high and medium high and are likely to be lost (Figure 3.). This 
represents a serious loss to the community.  All of these buildings are in the downtown 
area and many are tourist attractions such as shops, hotels, and restaurants. The few 
jobs that exist in Cayucos are tied to these businesses, putting the economic existence 
of the community at risk. Also, a small gas station is located in the inundation area 
downtown.  Flooding could potentially cause a release of petroleum products, fouling the 
local waterfront or causing fires (Figure 4.).   
Additionally, the small Cayucos fire station scored medium high and is likely to be 
lost, depriving fire fighters of the use of its facilities and equipment.  The station could be 
rendered totally irrelevant at a time when it is needed the most. There is another fire 
station, operated by CAL FIRE, on the south side of Cayucos that is outside of the 
inundation area. This is a small station with limited capabilities, staffed only by a fire 
captain and one to four fire fighters with one engine (Cal Fire, 2014).  This small station 
is designed to respond to auto accidents and ocean rescues, and may be overwhelmed 
by an emergency on the scale of a tsunami.  The Cayucos elementary school is on the 
upper edge of the inundation area.  Several of its buildings scored medium in the 
vulnerability assessment, and others are actually outside of the modeled inundation 
zone. 
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Figure 3. Commercial Building Vulnerability 
 
 
Figure 4. Downtown Cayucos Building Vulnerability 
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Housing 
Houses in the inundation area are very vulnerable. Homes in Cayucos are 
generally one and two story, of wood frame construction, parallel to the ocean and 
without much vegetation or protective structures around them.  There is nothing about 
many of them that afford any tsunami resistance.  A total of 55.8% of houses scored 
high and medium high on the vulnerability scale. No houses in the inundation area rated 
low, and very few (3.7%) rated medium low (figure 5.). Given a 500 year tsunami event 
with a 12.1 meter runup, all of the houses in the inundation area would suffer damage, 
and about half would be total losses.   
According to the 2010 U.S. Census the average household size in Cayucos is 
1.97 people per household. Multiplying this figure by the 700 homes affected leads to the 
conclusion that 1,379 people might potentially be put out of their homes.  Since 55.8 % 
of homes are expected to be completely destroyed 769 people may be left permanently 
homeless.  However, an unknown (but likely significant) percentage of houses in 
Cayucos are known to be either second homes or vacation rentals. Depending on 
whether the actual tsunami struck during tourist season or a weekend or holiday, the 
number of displaced could be higher or lower than the estimated 1,379.  Also, given that 
some houses in Cayucos are second homes the actual number of people left 
permanently homeless is likely to be less than 769.       
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              Figure 5. Housing Vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
Other Vulnerable Areas 
 A trailer park is located on the bank of Cayucos Creek, a vulnerable area, but 
was not included in the study’s PTVA assessment as trailers are not accounted 
for in the original methodology.  Given their light construction and lack of 
foundations, trailers are undoubtedly highly vulnerable to tsunamis, and in the 
event of one striking many trailers would be lost.  Also, as they are not 
permanent structures, the number of trailers in the trailer park can vary, making 
accurate accounting difficult.  Approximately a third of the trailer park is within the 
modeled inundation zone. 
 The Cayucos water treatment facility is located a short distance from the ocean, 
up Old Creek.  The facility consists of a large, circular tank, a few metal buildings 
and settling ponds.  These buildings were not suitable for analysis with the PTVA 
method.  However the tsunami inundation model indicates the possibility of 4.7 
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meters of water in this area, making it unlikely that the plant could continue 
operations or remain intact.  The flooding of this facility could result in the loss of 
drinking water for all of Cayucos and possibly the contamination of Old Creek 
with chemicals. 
 The iconic Cayucos pier, central to the community’s identity and appeal to 
tourists, is located downtown at the mouth of Cayucos Creek. It is over a hundred 
years old and built of wood. The SLO County LHMP states that docks and piers 
are very vulnerable to tsunami damage.  Given its material and age, it is unlikely 
to survive inundation by the 12.1 meter tsunami modeled in this assessment. 
 There are several bridges in and around Cayucos that could be vulnerable to 
damage during a large tsunami.  These include Ocean Avenue bridge, Old Creek 
bridge, and Torro Creek bridge.  If these were impassible following a tsunami it 
would seriously impair relief and recovery efforts. 
Modeling a More Resistant Community 
A strength of the PTVA model is that it is dynamic. Attribute scores can be 
manipulated to calculate different theoretical outcomes.  For example, since the majority 
of the buildings in Cayucos are built of the most vulnerable material (wood, raw score 3) 
and also oriented in the most vulnerable way (parallel to the ocean, raw score 3) we can 
change the scores in these attribute fields to model a scenario in which the study area’s 
buildings are built of more sturdy materials, and with a less vulnerable orientation.  To do 
this, raw scores for the building material and orientation attributes were changed from 
3’s to 2’s, and the scores recalculated.  The result allows for a view into how building 
attributes, like those governed by building codes, might influence the community’s 
overall survivability.   
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Modeling the new scenario we see quite a different outcome in vulnerability 
ratings (figure 6. and 7.).  The new hypothetical Cayucos is far less vulnerable to a 500 
year tsunami.  Owing to the increased durability of materials and building orientation that 
attenuates wave force, the number of buildings in the most vulnerable building classes 
(high and medium high) are reduced by 71.9% (58.8% to 16.5%) in the new model.  By 
avoiding wood structures and parallel orientation to the shoreline, the model suggests 
that significant gains in overall survivability can be attained.  This in no way substitutes 
for an in-depth structural engineering study of tsunami resistant building design.  Rather, 
it roughly indicates what gains in survivability could be attained through building design, 
and the results are dramatic.  Adopting special building codes for tsunami prone areas 
could be a positive long-term mitigation strategy in SLO County. 
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               Figure 6. Revised Vulnerability Ratings for a Theoretically More Durable         
               Cayucos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 Figure 7. The Study’s Original Results 
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4. Conclusion 
The PTVA’s Pros and Cons 
The PTVA model goes into far greater detail than studies in existing state and 
local hazard mitigation plans.  It proves to be a user friendly, useful tool to delineate the 
most vulnerable areas, down to the individual building, and to discover probable tsunami 
impacts.  However the PTVA model does have limitations. 
One limitation with the model is the time consuming data collection and ground 
truthing inherent to it.  Cayucos is small enough to complete a 100 percent sample of 
buildings in the inundation area.  However in other communities there could be 
thousands of buildings to assess, making a 100 percent sample lengthy, if not 
impossible.  The alternative to a 100 percent sample is taking a representative sample 
and then using inferential statistics to calculate scores for the un-sampled buildings.  
Another limitation is the classification of building materials used in the model.  
The model only accounts for three classes of material:  
1. Wood frame, steel frame with wood walls  
2. Stone and concrete and brick 
3. Reinforced concrete 
In the Cayucos there are many buildings that have a stucco veneer, and fell in no 
obvious category. The PTVA model was not developed in California, and does not reflect 
common local construction methods. The building material attribute must be correct for 
types of construction in the region that it is being used in.  An expanded palette of 
material classes would be a great improvement to the model. 
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 Though the model has been validated in the field by looking at damage caused 
by actual tsunamis, it should be not be relied on as a definitive prediction of damage.  
There are many factors affecting how tsunamis are generated and interact with the 
urban environment; some of which have yet to be understood.  The model also depends 
on using runup predictions that do have the chance of being exceeded, perhaps 
dramatically.  The 2011 tsunami in Japan showed that tsunami and earthquake events 
can exceed predicted levels of magnitude.  Additionally, the exceedance of these 
estimates will be more likely as sea level rise impacts the coast (up to 5.48 feet).  It 
cannot be stressed enough that findings in this type of study are estimates for planning 
purposes and not precise predictions of damage.   
Planning Discussion and Recommendations 
Despite any shortcomings inherent to the PTVA, this report has gone into a much 
deeper level of study than any existing documents about the area’s tsunami vulnerability.   
This, in conjunction with the LHMP, Tsunami Emergency Response Plan and CAL 
FIRE’s tsunami planning map allow for a more than basic understanding of the 
community's tsunami vulnerability.  In the future our understanding will continue to grow 
with the development of probabilistic tsunami modeling, and building fragility curves.  
There are many things that could be done to mitigate the hazard detailed in this 
study.  Efforts can range from large, capital intensive building projects to the institution of 
educational programs.  Deciding just what measures to take and striking a balance 
between costs and benefits associated with planning for a 500-year return interval 
tsunami is a considerable challenge.  Planning for a 500-year return interval tsunami has 
already been done by the county; evacuation areas were based on 500-year runup 
estimations.  Some more extreme mitigation measures may simply not be politically 
possible given the limited risk of the hazard and budgetary constraints.  Deciding what 
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further measures to take could benefit from an ongoing discussion with Cayucos 
residents to gauge their perception of the risk.   
Ideally we could avoid new development in tsunami run-up areas to minimize 
future tsunami losses; but Cayucos is nearly at “build out”, especially on the ocean front.  
There are only a few vacant lots in the inundation area: notably, a handful along 
Cayucos Creek, two large commercial lots on N. Ocean Avenue in downtown, and 
several small residential lots scattered in the Pacific Drive area.  Limiting the 
development of these lots for tsunami mitigation by the County is extremely unlikely as it 
could be politically unpopular and hinder economic development, while purchasing them 
may be prohibitively expensive.    
Focusing on evacuation and education may be the most effective method to limit 
loss of life during the next tsunami.  Evacuating northern Cayucos may not be too 
problematic. There are excellent maps from CAL FIRE that detail evacuation routes, and 
a system of warning sirens is in place to issue warnings.  Gaining high ground does not 
require a long drive or walk in Cayucos.  A walk of approximately a quarter mile (1300 
feet) is all that is required to exit the inundation area from anywhere in downtown.  The 
residential areas along Pacific Avenue require an even shorter walk to safety, of about 
500 feet, and there are many streets leading inland that offer evacuation routes. 
Evacuation of these areas is relatively simple as they do not require pedestrians to cross 
any barriers, like Highway 101 which runs right through the community.  
The situation is different in southern Cayucos. Evacuating the inundation area 
along low lying Studio Drive on foot would require crossing Highway 101. While the 
distance to safety in this area is not great, the highway offers a serious impediment.  In 
addition to high traffic volume that could be present during a general evacuation, there 
are also wire fences lining the highway to keep out people and animals.  Unless people 
are willing to jump the fence, crossing the highway on foot requires using one of only 
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three roads leading from the highway into the long, narrow Studio Drive corridor.  If one 
could directly cross the highway, the walk to safety would be only 300 to 500 feet.  
However, traveling to an intersection and then crossing the highway increases the walk 
to 900-1600 feet.  
Evacuating Cayucos by car may not be a problem for most people; the area has 
well developed and maintained roadways and generally low traffic.  However, bridges on 
Highway 101 could become impassable in the event of high tsunami inundation.  This 
would cut Cayucos off from emergency services coming from larger cities to the south, 
and deprive people of what may be their first choice of an evacuation route.  Access to 
the inland cities of Paso Robles and Atascadero would still be available via Old Creek rd. 
and Highway 46 to the north. 
There are many efforts that could be undertaken to educate the public about 
evacuations, the risk of tsunamis and the potential extent of the inundation area. 
Teaching people what to do, where to go, and how to get there in the event of a tsunami 
may be the most efficient mitigation strategy for protecting them. There are simple ways 
to accomplish this.  For example, in Hawaii there are inundation maps published in the 
local phone books, and signs demarcating tsunami inundation zones in populated areas.  
Becoming Tsunamiready® will ensure that these types of education materials are 
available to educate residents about the danger presented by tsunamis, and that local 
government is prepared to respond.   
As the federal and state governments begin to implement tsunami mitigation 
there are still some local measures that could be taken. Looking to principles from the 
Tsunami Policy Working Group’s 2015 report can provide guidance for further specific 
measures that could be applied to Cayucos. The principles encourage short and long 
term strategies, some that incorporate multiple hazards. These include:  
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1. Implementing a new building code for inundation areas that ensures tsunami 
resistant designs for new buildings.   
As figures 6 and 7 show, building design has the potential to greatly 
improve survivability during tsunami inundation.  Building codes designed for 
safety and hazard mitigation are certainly not new in California.  They already 
exist for fire and earthquake resistance.  Tsunami resistant building codes would 
affect relatively few future construction projects (only those within the mapped 
inundation zone) while increasing the county’s resilience to tsunamis. Standards 
for this are currently being developed. The International Building Code will 
contain updates for tsunami resistance by 2018 (CGS, 2015).  These codes 
could become mandated by the state if designated tsunami inundation zones are 
formed.  Otherwise it is in SLO County’s jurisdiction to implement new building 
codes in coastal areas. 
 
2. Creating policies for retrofitting public buildings to ensure tsunami survivability, 
and offer vertical evacuation for residents. 
The technology for designing raised, tsunami proof shelters is already 
developed.  Often they are constructed of concrete and steel; or soil in 
“engineered high ground” that can be incorporated into parks and openspace 
(FEMA, 2009).  FEMA has published a design manual Guidelines for Design of 
Structures for Vertical Evacuation from Tsunamis, and the west coast’s first 
vertical evacuation structure is under construction in Westport, Oregon. There, a 
school on a flat peninsula with limited evacuation routes is being built with a 
raised shelter for students.  
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This is a long- term mitigation strategy that could be difficult and 
expensive to implement.  In a place like Cayucos, where ocean views are 
important to people, the tall structure of a vertical tsunami shelter may block 
views and be unpopular with residents. The cost of this measure could also be 
prohibitive in a small community, and the benefit may be marginal.  The most 
vulnerable and densely inhabited place in Cayucos, the downtown, may be 
evacuated on foot by walking approximately a quarter mile.  Assuming that 
people know what to do in the event of an earthquake and local tsunami it is 
reasonable to believe that all ambulatory people could make it to a safe area.  
However, a structure should not be ruled out. Having one would provide shelter 
to those who may not be physically able to evacuate or if a locally produced 
tsunami came in with no time for warnings or evacuation by foot.  A vertical 
shelter may make more sense for the Studio Drive area than the downtown, 
given the greater difficulty involved in evacuating the former. 
 
3. Incorporating tsunami hazards into regional land–use planning and strategies to 
mitigate climate impacts, such as increasingly intense coastal storms, coastal 
flooding, and sea level rise. 
 In Cayucos there are opportunities for tsunami mitigation that could also 
mitigate coastal erosion and sea level rise.  These include: 
1. Developing policies to prevent post-tsunami redevelopment of the most 
vulnerable waterfront parcels.  
2. Strengthening the downtown seawall.   
After a tsunami has devastated a city, there is the option of not rebuilding in 
flood prone areas.  Hilo, Hawaii as a good example of this.  Downtown Hilo used 
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to look much like Cayucos with a water front row of commercial buildings.  In the 
1960’s the most flood prone areas of the city were abandoned after suffering the 
loss of 219 people and millions of dollars in damage to two tsunamis in the space 
of fourteen years (Curtis, 2008).  This included the waterfront block formerly 
occupied by commercial buildings.  Hawaii County acquired the water front 
parcels using federal redevelopment funds, and these areas are now open space 
that serve as a park as well as a buffer against future tsunamis, coastal flooding 
and sea level rise.  
A similar decision was made in New York City in the wake of Hurricane 
Sandy where extreme flooding affected many coastal residential areas. The 
governor of New York used Federal Community Development Block Grant 
Disaster Recovery Program funds to buy and demolish damaged houses in high 
risk areas, at pre-Sandy prices.  He says the land will be “given back to mother 
nature” to serve as a buffer to future storm surge (Jervey, 2013). 
As sea level rises and tsunamis and storm surge come to affect more 
urban areas, more frequently, we may see a gradual, nationwide retreat from 
water front properties. One day Cayucos may end up looking like Hilo, with open 
space in place of its first row of waterfront buildings.  After the tragic event of a 
tsunami, this could be a good option for Cayucos.  Not rebuilding the first row of 
buildings would not only mitigate the effects of tsunamis, erosion and sea level 
rise on the downtown, but could benefit the community in other ways, by 
increasing recreation space and enhancing ocean views. 
The 500-year tsunami modeled in this study may not strike for hundreds 
or thousands of years, making the policy of preventing rebuilding a moot point at 
this time. However, sea level rise and increased vulnerability to erosion and 
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storm surge are here today.  Building a modern, concrete seawall may be a good 
investment to protect the first block of oceanfront buildings and downtown from 
future flooding. Properly designed and built seawalls have been shown to limit 
tsunami damage to areas behind them (Dominey-Howes, 2007), and can provide 
protection against tsunamis as well as sea level rise and coastal erosion (CA 
OES, 2013).   
The current seawall in downtown Cayucos appears to have been built in 
stages over the years.  It consists of four sections of varying heights and 
materials: the southernmost and northernmost sections are low rock rip-rap, 
while the middle is divided in two halves composed of concrete approximately 
two meters high, and cinder block about one meter high.  The seawall seems to 
have been adequate until now, but as sea level rises up to five feet in the next 
century, increased erosive forces could act on the beach.  As this beach erodes 
more wave force will begin to act upon the seawall, and the more weakly 
constructed sections of the wall could fail.   
There are several modern concrete designs of seawalls that could work 
for Cayucos.  For example, a curved design, of reinforced concrete would direct 
wave energy back to sea and prevent most waves from overtopping it. 
Constructing these modern seawalls can be expensive, as building one involves 
careful engineering and quality materials.  The cost of constructing a seawall can 
run well into the millions of dollars (Linham, 2010).  Also, there are maintenance 
costs involved if a seawall is to remain functioning at peak performance.   
There are several disadvantages to seawalls. Seawalls can be 
undermined by wave action and fail, or the land flanking the wall may become 
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naturally eroded and result in a stepped appearance of the coast or even help 
undermine the seawall.  They can also starve the beach of sediment that would 
otherwise have come from the protected land, thus protecting the land while 
increasing beach erosion (Linham, 2010).  A modern seawall could protect 
against landward erosion, storm surge, and sea level rise but may not be enough 
protection from all tsunamis.  Any seawall may be no match for the 500-year, 40 
foot tsunami modeled in this study; but could confer protection against lesser, 
more probable tsunami events.  The multi-hazard mitigation aspect of a seawall 
makes this a viable option for Cayucos. 
 
4. Encouraging property owners and renters located within State-designated 
tsunami hazard zones to obtain coverage from the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP). 
There are no practical measures that can be used to physically protect all 
of the houses and businesses in the inundation area from tsunamis.  Educating 
people about the need for, and availability of, insurance may be more effective at 
protecting their assets than physical measures.  Directing people towards 
insurance, including subsidized insurance as it is available, is the right thing to do 
in the situation.  
The PTVA method has proven useful in assessing vulnerability in a small coastal 
town, and could easily be applied to other coastal communities in the county.  This study 
took a single researcher nine months of part time work to complete.  A significant portion 
of this time was spent figuring out how to apply the PTVA model to Cayucos and using 
GIS to model inundation, update the incomplete buildings layer, and input data in 
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conjunction with Google Street view.  Being familiar with using the PTVA model and 
working full time would significantly speed the process.    
This study has uncovered that the majority of buildings in the inundation area, 
and the majority of commercial buildings in Cayucos, are vulnerable not just to 
inundation, but also to complete destruction.  This extreme vulnerability is a result of the 
low lying coast and also the fact that most buildings in Cayucos happen to be 
constructed in a way that makes them highly vulnerable to tsunamis.  Fortunately the 
chance of a 500-year tsunami event occurring like the one modeled in this study is only 
.2% each year.  However, it is a question of when and not if a major tsunami event will 
affect San Luis Obispo County.  Until that day comes we must strive to increase our 
preparedness as much as is practically possible.  It is the author’s hope that this study 
will play at least a small role in helping to protect lives and property in the future.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. SLO Fire Department, Northern Cayucos Inundation Map 
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Appendix B. NWS/NOAA TsunamiReady® Guidelines 
 
Guidelines  Population  
   < 
2,500  
2,500 - 
14,999  
15,000 - 
40,000  
> 40,000  
Guideline 1: Communications and Coordination 
Established 24-hour Warning Point (WP)  X*  X*  X  X  
Established Emergency Operations Center (EOC)  X*  X*  X  X  
Guideline 2: Tsunami Warning Reception              
Number of ways for EOC/WP to receive NWS 
tsunami messages. (If in range, one must be NWR 
receiver with tone alert; NWR-SAME is preferred)  
3  4  4  4  
Guideline 3: Local Warning Dissemination  
Number of ways EOC/WP can disseminate warnings 
to public  
1  2  3  4  
NWR - SAME receivers in public facilities  X  X  X  X  
For county/borough warning points, county/borough 
communication network that ensures information 
flow among communities  
X  X  X  X  
Guideline 4: Community Preparedness  
Number of annual tsunami awareness programs  1  2  3  4  
Designate/establish tsunami shelter/area in safe zone  X  X  X  X  
Designate tsunami evacuation areas and evacuation 
routes, and install evacuation route signs  
X  X  X  X  
Provide written, locally specific, tsunami hazard 
response material to public  
X  X  X  X  
Schools: Encourage tsunami hazard curriculum, 
practice evacuations (if in hazard zone), and provide 
safety material to staff and students.  
X  X  X  X  
Guideline 5: Administrative  
Formal tsunami hazard operations plan  X  X  X  X  
Biennial meeting between emergency manager and 
NWS  
X  X  X  X  
Visit by NWS official to community at least every 
other year  
X  X  X  X  
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Appendix C. Map of Cayucos 
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Appendix D. Field Data Sheet 
 
 
